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Abstract—The Internet was originally designed to support
universal reachability by allowing any host to communicate with
any end server over the globe. Unfortunately, this feature has
been abused by attackers to overload the servers with malicious
traffic. In order to deal with this situation, many mechanisms
such as Firewalls and Access Lists have been introduced to
restrict servers’ accessibility only to legitimate users. This paper
discusses some of these mechanisms, highlights their pros and
cons and then proposes a new mechanism that attempts to limit
a server’s reachability based on its operational scope.
I. INTRODUCTION
Whenever a device accesses the Internet, it needs to reg-
ister with some Internet servers such as the Domain Name
System (DNS)[5] [6] and the Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP)[7] [8] to uniquely identify itself and obtain
network resources. This allows information to be sent and
routed among hosts over the globe. The current Internet is
characterised by its open and dynamic nature, these properties
enable the Internet to provide universal reachability; any host
could send (and receive) any volume/type of traffic to (and
from) any other host. This traffic might contain unwanted,
hidden software that installs itself on the destination device
and acts maliciously.
This open nature of the Internet, makes it vulnerable to
serious security threats which come in form of compromise
and resource exhaustion attacks. While the first subverts the
victim end host itself (client or server), the latter leaves the
server intact but however overloads it with a huge volume of
traffic and thus preventing it from serving legitimate clients.
These two attacks target the availability of services and thus,
are categorized as forms of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
An obvious solution to deal with these attacks is by con-
trolling access to the victim through the implementation of
primitive mechanisms such as Access Control Lists (ACls) [9]
[10], Firewalls [11] and Network Address Translation (NAT)
[1] [3]. However, as will be discussed later, these mechanisms
are adds-on to the communication procedure rather than an
integrated security solution, this increases the complexity of
setting up the connection and breaks the desired end-to-end
connectivity feature of the Internet. Therefore, the authors
in [2] proposed a comprehensive way for restricting servers’
accessibility known as ”Off By Default”. Unlike the current
”On By Default”, the servers in the ” Off By Default” world
could specify the source and the type of the traffic, they are
willing to receive and thus, restricting the server accessibility.
In spite of the significance of this approach, there are many
implementation concerns in terms of the scalability and adapt-
ability of this concept in the current Internet structure.
In order to address the shortages of ”Off By Default” and to
provide a systematic way to define and enforce servers’ reach-
ability, the authors in this paper introduce the scope concept
which limits servers’ visibility based on their functionality,
and thus, four scopes have been proposed: Local, Local Area
Network (LAN); Domain and Global scopes. Additionally,
to show how these scopes could be enforced, the authors
proposed novel models that describe the transactions between
different components of the Internet. The paper is organised
as follows: Section 2 analyses current, security mechanisms
namely, the ACL, Firewall; NAT and ”Off By Default” which
control the server’s accessibility. An enhanced model of the ”
Off by Default” by integrating the scopes concept is presented
in Section 3. In Section 4, our proposed model is presented
along with the recently introduced new addressing scheme. A
potential application of the proposed model with 4G systems
is described in Section 5. Further work and the conclusion are
presented in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORK
The proposed security applications to address the afore-
explained situation are mainly based on access control mech-
anisms, these are as follows:
A. Access Control Lists and Firewalls
One of the earliest attempts to enforce access control was
by configuring ACLs on the network’s routers, ACLs provide
basic packet filtering to protect the networks from the outside
world [9]; they filter the traffic and based on pre-configured
criteria such as the Source/destination IP address or ports
numbers, they will forward or block packets on the interface
routers. As stated in [9], configuring ACLs on the edge routers
could mitigate many threats such as IP spoofing and DoS
TCP SYN flooding. However, configuring ACLs is an error-
prone procedure and for each traffic type a new rule has to be
added. Additionally, ACLs perform stateless packet inspection
without considering the state of the whole session.
Firewalls address the shortages of basic ACLs, provide lay-
ered defence mechanisms; perform stateful packet inspection
and have application awareness for a few transport protocols.
This offers a higher level of protection than basic packet
filtering. The firewalls also consider the state of the connection
and thus, differentiate between packets belonging to different
sessions. However, the problem with the Firewall is that, it
breaks a single sessions into two connections and thus, it can
have detrimental effects on end-to-end performance.
B. Network Address Translation
The idea of hiding the identity of the servers from external
entities was initially proposed by the Network Address Trans-
lation (NAT) [1] where the NAT server acts as an IP converter
that maps private IP addresses (the ones used in the internal
network) to globally, registered addresses, in an attempt to
allow hosts in private networks to transparently communicate
with external hosts and visa versa.
However, the implementation of the NAT does not come
without potential drawbacks. For instance, the connection
between the hosts residing behind the NAT is broken on the
first NAT-supporting router, this contradicts with the end-to-
end concept which used to be the core principle of the current
Internet [3]. Additionally, there are serious concerns about the
operability of the NAT and Firewalls as well as the scalability
of the NAT database.
C. Off By Default
To reduce the complexity and the overhead resulting from
implementing the previous mechanisms, the authors in [2]
proposed an integrated, access control-based approach through
which, the host explicitly specifies the traffic it wants routed to
it; thus defining its reachability. In this approach, the routers
will not automatically route the packets unless explicitly
directed to do so by the destination host.
This proposal however suffers from a number of drawbacks:
Firstly, this approach requires the network to maintain ac-
cessibility information for each destination, this might place
a burden on the network infrastructure. Secondly, the end
host should be able to regulate its reachability for a wide
spectrum of applications and protocols, update it in case of any
modification, and then convey this information to the access
router in a systematic way. Table I summarizes the pros and
cons of the access control mechanisms.
III. THE ENHANCED OFF BY DEFAULT
Although, the approach of ”Off By Default” has addressed
many drawbacks of the primitive access control mechanisms, it
comes with problems of its own which might set challenges in
front of any implementation attempt. Therefore, in this section,
we introduce our approach to address the afore-mentioned
security challenges. Our proposal is based on the ”Off By
Default” approach, however; it avoids most of its shortages.
TABLE I
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE RELATED APPROACHES
The Mechanism Advantages Disadvantages
ACLs Mitigates IP spoofing
and DoS TCP SYN
flooding
Provides only state-
less packet inspection
Firewalls Support layered de-
fence mechanism and
stateful packet filter-
ing
Break the end-to-
end connection’s
property, adds-on
security mechanism
that is vulnerable to
configuration error
NAT Less administrative
effort, was the first to
hide the identity of
the server rather than
preventing packets
from getting to it
Contradicts with the
end-to-end concept,
interoperability
problems with
the Firewalls and
newer version of IP
addresses
Off By Default More integrated than
the previous mecha-
nisms
Place a burden on
the network infras-
tructure, Not fully in-
tegrated
In summary, our proposed approach tries to address the
following drawbacks of the ”Off By Default”:
1) Currently, with the ”Off By Default”, the server could
choose the hosts it wants to accept traffic from, this
approach is not scalable nor applicable. To deal with
this situation, it might be better for the server to set
more general rules to determine its accessibility rather
than specifying access rules per host.
2) Although, the ”Off By Default” provided a certain
degree of integration, the server still needs to explicitly
specify its reachability to the gateway router which will
propagate this to all routers via routing table update
procedure. We agree that the gateway router must be
aware of the server’s accessibility, however, the process
of conveying this information outside the network should
be accomplished with a minimum involvement of the
server. Additionally, we believe that only concerned
entities should know the server’s accessibility.
A. The Scope Concept
To address the problems of ”Off By Default”, we propose
a novel, more efficient approach to convey the access control
information to the relevant entities. In this approach the visi-
bility of servers is defined by the scope of there functionality,
thus, four main scopes have been introduced:
• The Local Scope: Local services could only be accessed
from within the same machine; The existence and state
of the services are not made known to any devices or
applications outside the machine.
• The LAN Scope: the services are available for the clients
at the Local Area Network (LAN).
• The DOMAIN Scope: the Server is accessible for all
client within the Administrative domain. For instance
only users of the www.XYZ.com could access the sever.
• The Global Scope: The service is available and accessible
globally for all the clients over the Internet.
In contrast to the ”Off by Default” approach where the host
itself informs the gateway router about its desired reachability
and the router then propagates this information via the routing
update procedures, we believe it would be more efficient to
launch the accessibility information on a global service such as
the DNS thus, the sever needs to include its scope information
in the initial DNS registration.
B. A Proposed Model
The proposed model discusses the case of a corresponding
node (CN) trying to contact a remote server. As shown in Fig
1, the model comprises the following entities:
• The Corresponding Node is the host trying to contact the
Sever.
• The Source Access Router (SrcAR) is the gateway router
of the CN’s network, it relays packets to and from the
Internet.
• The Source DNS (SrcDNS) is the authoritative naming
server of the source network.
• The Destination DNS (DesDNS) is the authoritative DNS
of the Server’s network.
• The Destination Access Router (DesAR) is the gateway
router in the destination network.
• The Server is the node receiving the connection requests
The access router in the destination network is responsible
for controlling Server’s accessibility based on its scope. We
presume that the Server has previously registered itself with
its authoritative naming service (DesDNS).
As shown in Fig 1, the transactions, needed for initiating
a connection between the CN and the Server are as follows:
1) Msg 1: The CN, using the Server’s name, asks its
authoritative DNS (SrcDNS) for the Server’s address.
Since this is the first transaction between the CN and
the Server, the SrcDNS does not hold any records for
the Server and thus, it probes the Server’s authoritative
DNS (DesDNS).
2) Msg 2: Once the SrcDNS gets the Server’s information-
including the scope- from the DesDNS, it returns the
Sever’s IP address.
3) Msg 3: Now since the CN knows the Server’s address,
it sends a connection request packet with the Server’s
address in the destination address field.
4) Msg 4: When the request gets to the SrcAR, it checks
with the SrcDNS for the server’s scope. If the the scope
indicates that it is accessible by the CN, the SrcAR
passes the connection request to the DesAR, otherwise,
the packet is dropped.
5) Msg 5: The DesAR checks the packet’s destination
address once again and verifies that it’s allowed to go
through to the server.
Since the server needs to reveal its scope to the authoritative
DNS only at the initial registration, the server’s intervention is
kept to a minimum. Additionally, unlike ”Off By Default”, the
Fig. 1. The Connection Model
scope information is provided only to the requesting hosts via
explicit DNS request. In ”Off By Default”, scope information
is propagated -via router update- to the neighbour routers,
many of which might not be ever involved in setting up a
connection to the server, also when the server is globally
accessible, the scope information should be available at a
global level and this support the argument of using a global
service such as the DNS to propagate the scope information.
Moreover, in case of modifying the server’s scope, there might
be a time delay before all the relevant routers are updated via
the routing table updates.
However, one major drawback of the proposed model is in
transferring the scope information to the access router; for
each connection request, the access router (SrcAR) has to
explicitly approach the DNS to get the scope information.
This is an extra work for the router and it breaks the flow
of the communication procedure. Therefore, a more integrated
approach to reduce the complexity of this model and eliminate
the extra work will be investigated in the following section.
IV. AN INTEGRATED SECURITY MODEL
As was highlighted in the previous section, there is a need
to launch the scopes in the access routers via an integrated
approach. One potential solution might be by dynamically
launching the scope information in the router without explic-
itly referring to the DNS. This could be achieved if we include
the server’s scope within its address format. In this case, the
router will recognize the server’s scope by checking its address
without consulting the DNS sever. The authors in [4] have
proposed a novel addressing scheme which includes a Scope
Field (SF) that determines the host accessibility.
A. The New Addressing Scheme
As shown in Fig 2, the new address comprises 128 bits
divided into three portions: a 56-bit Location ID which corre-
sponds to the network address of the IP, it defines the address
of the access network to which the MN is attached. The
Node ID is a 64 bits long and it uniquely defines the device
regardless of the number of the Network Interface Cards
(NICs) it might have. an 8 bits long field called NetAdmin
Fig. 2. The New Addressing Scheme
and it is responsible for the following network administering
tasks:
• The Scope Field (SF): is a 2-bit field, responsible for
defining nodes’ accessibility. So The value 00 represents
a local service which could be accessed only from within
the same machine, so remote devices will not even know
about these services. The value 01, indicates LAN scope
in which the node is only accessible by other devices on
the same LAN. The value 10 signals that only machines
on the same site are allowed to access the server. The
value of 11 denotes that the device can be globally
accessed.
• The Static (S) field: this 1-bit long field indicates that the
node is static or mobile.
• The Multicast (M) field: when set, this bit indicates that
the address represents a multicast group rather than a
unicast address.
• The Interface Number Field (INF): is a 4-bit field used to
address up to 16 virtual or physical network interfaces.
Where the address 0 defines any-cast address, 0xF is a
broadcast address and 0x1 is the primary interface.
B. The Proposed Integrated Model
As shown in Fig 3, the system comprises the same entities
explained in Section III-B, the only difference is that the IP
address will be replaced by the new addressing scheme. Also,
similar to the previous model, we presume that the server has
already registered itself with the authoritative DNS server thus,
the DNS knows the server’s address which includes the Scope
Field (SF). Also, similar to the ” Off By default”, we presume
that the DesAR is aware of the Server’s address, however, this
is not propagated to other routers.
When the corresponding node (CN) wants to communicate
with the server, the connection procedure goes as follows:
The CN knows the server’s Internet Name (DNS name) so
it approaches the DNS to get the server’s address. Once the
CN receives the full address (Node and Location IDs), it
composes a connection request which has the server’s address
in the destination address field. When this request gets to the
router (SrcAR), it checks the SF of the destination address. If
Fig. 3. The Integrated Connection Model
the SF indicates that the server is accessible to the CN, the
SrcAR passes the connection request, otherwise, it’s dropped
by the router. When the request gets to the DesAR, it compares
the request’s destination address with the Server’s address
and checks the SF. This procedure mitigates address spoofing
attacks; for instance if the CN has changed the scope defined in
the SF, the SrcAR will not be able to discover this. However, it
will be discovered when the DesAR compares the destination
with the server address thus, the request will be dropped on
the DesAR.
V. INTEGRATION WITH 4G SYSTEMS
Since 4G is an IP-Based environment, it will suffer from
most of the IP-specific security vulnerabilities found in the
Internet. Therefore, it is possible for the proposed security
mechanism to be used to protect the server in 4G systems
such as the Y-Comm framework [12] [13].
A. The Y-Comm Framework
Y-Comm is a 4G, communication architecture to support
vertical handover for multi-homed nodes in heterogeneous
environment. The architecture has two frameworks:
• The Peripheral framework deals with operation on the
mobile terminal.
• The Core framework deals with functions in the core
network to support different peripheral networks.
As shown in Fig 4, the two frameworks share a common
base subsystem consisting of the hardware platform and net-
work abstraction layers. Both frameworks diverge in terms of
functionality but the corresponding layers interact to provide
support for heterogeneous environments.
To support multi-homed nodes, the Network Abstraction
Layer (NAL) contains the drivers of different networks and
thus provides a common interface that supports different
networking technologies. Additionally, issues such as network
operability and overlapping are addressed by this layer.
B. Security in Y-Comm
The Y-Comm’s security approach approach is based on the
concepts of an Integrated Security Module (ISM) to protect
data and Targeted Security Models (TSMs) which are needed
Fig. 4. The Complete Structure of Y-Comm
to protect entities, such as users and servers that are using the
open infrastructure [14] [15]. As shown in Fig 4, the four-
layer security model comprises the following layers:
• Service and Application Security (SAS): provide security
at the application level.
• QoS-Based Security (QBS): concerned with QoS issues
and the changes of QoS as the Mobile device moves
around.
• Network Transport Security (NTS): is used to set up
secure connections through the core network.
• Network Architecture Security (NAS): addresses security
issues in the peripheral access network.
Y-Comm proposes three targeted security models (TSMs),
these are as follow:
• The connection security model: protecting the connection
between users and thus it is mainly related to security of
the connection initiation process.
• The handover security model: facilitates secure vertical
handover and attempts to prevent network resources from
being abused and overloaded.
• The Ring-Based security model: is concerned with re-
stricting access to servers by using the concept of scope;
so servers are only accessible by the users in the same
scope. There are four scopes: Local, LAN, domain and
global.
We believe that, the proposed model in this paper along with
the new addressing scheme could facilitate the Ring-Based
security model.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated current mechanisms to secure
servers over the Internet. The result showed that, many of
the current mechanisms suffer from major drawbacks mainly
related to the scalability and lack of integration. Therefore,
we propose a new model based on the previously introduced
” Off By Default” concept. The proposed model introduces
the scope concept where server’s visibility is determined by
its range of functionality. The work on a testbed, composed
of Linux routers has started at Middlesex University, this will
be used to implement the proposed model along with the new
addressing scheme.
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